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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
A. TRIAL COURT. 
The trial had jurisdiction over the Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Sections 30-3-10.4 and 
78-3-4, 1988 as amended. 
B. COURT OF APPEALS. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), 
1990 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. The trial court applied the proper test in determining 
that no substantial and material change of circumstances had 
occurred between the parties and, thus, there was no abuse of 
discretion in its decision not to modify the parties decree of 
divorce sought by Appellant. 
II. There is no change of circumstances when the changes that 
have occurred are within reasonable contemplation of the parties 
at the time of the initial decree. 
III. The best interests of the minor children were taken into 
consideration by the trial court below. 
IV. The joint custodial arrangement between the parties is 
of no significance in determining whether a change of circumstances 
has occurred. 
V. The trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to the 
Appellee under the circumstances of the case presented. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ETC. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-10.4, 1988 as amended, 
states, in pertinent part, that: 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal 
custodians the court may, after a hearing, modify an 
order that established joint legal custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or 
both custodians have materially and 
substantially changed since the entry of the 
order to be modified, or the order has become 
unworkable or inappropriate under existing 
circumstances; and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions 
of the decree would be an improvement for and 
in the best interest of the child. . . 
(3) If the court finds that an action under this section 
is filed or answered frivolously and in a manner designed 
to harass the other party, the court shall assess 
attorney's fees as costs against the offending party. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. This action was initially filed on March 31, 1987. The 
Complaint, filed by Appellant, alleged that joint custody of the 
parties two minor children should be awarded and that Appellant 
should be the primary custodial parent. (R. at 2-4). 
2. The Appellee answered the Complaint on April 24, 1987, 
wherein she denied the custody allegations set forth by Appellant. 
Further, Appellee specifically denied that Appellant should be 
awarded physical custody of the children and that she, in turn, 
should be awarded sole custody. (R. at 6). 
3. Appellant brought an Order to Show Cause asking for 
temporary care, custody and control of the parties minor children 
during the pendency of the divorce action. (R. at 11). 
4. In support of his request to obtain temporary custody 
pursuant to the Order to Show Cause, Appellant filed two Affidavits 
with the trial court. These Affidavits alleged that Appellee was 
living with her former husband, that the children were then living 
with Appellee, that Appellee's residence was not adequate nor a 
safe place for the children to live and that he was the more 
appropriate parent to be awarded temporary custody of the children. 
(R. at 8-9, 13-14). 
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5. In response, Appellee submitted an Affidavit alleging 
that Appellant had a drug dependency problem and was physically 
abusive to her and to her older children from a previous marriage. 
Further, Appellee argued that she was the more stable parent and 
was best able to care for the children on a temporary basis. (R. 
at 16-19, duplicate filing at 22-25). 
6. At the Order to Show Cause hearing of July 10, 1987, the 
parties argued the matter, through counsel, before Commissioner 
Sandra N. Peuler, Court Commissioner in the Third Judicial District 
Court. After hearing the evidence and arguments presented, the 
Commissioner's recommendation was that Appellee be awarded the 
temporary custody of the minor children and that Appellant be 
awarded reasonable visitation. The Commissioner further 
recommended that there be a custody evaluation, the cost of which 
Appellant was initially responsible. (Minute Entry, R. at 21). 
7. There was no filed objection to the recommendation and, 
therefore, the recommendation was reduced to an Order of the court 
on January 12, 1988. (R. at 30-31). 
8. The parties stipulated that a custody evaluation be done 
on the family and that the evaluation would be performed by Mr. Kim 
Peterson. (R. at 32). 
9. The custody evaluation was performed and the findings 
were released to counsel for the parties. The evaluation 
recommended was that the parties be awarded joint legal custody 
with Appellee being the primary custodial parent. Appellant paid 
for the evaluation with no contribution by Appellee. Appellant had 
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an opportunity to review the findings with his attorney. (T. at 
33, 102-103). 
10. During the pendency of the divorce action, Appellant had 
concerns regarding Appelleefs housekeeping skills, her hygiene and 
her parenting ability, her living arrangements and the environment 
in which the minor children were living. (R. at 8, 13- 14, T. at 
101-102). 
11. Appellee certified the divorce action for trial and the 
court scheduled a Pre-Trial Settlement Conference which was held 
on May 2, 1988. Appellant appeared with his attorney of record, 
Appellee did not appear. Commissioner Peuler, acting as Judge Pro 
Tempore, heard the matter wherein joint custody of the parties 
minor children was awarded with Appellee being designated as the 
primary custodial parent. A visitation schedule was established 
pursuant to the parties agreement. (Minute Entry, R. at 44A). 
12. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were drafted by 
Appellant's attorney. These documents stated that joint custody 
of the children be awarded with Appellant being the primary 
custodial parent, subject to specified visitation. There were no 
findings, nor were any conclusions made, regarding the necessity 
of Appellee following any custody evaluation recommendations made 
by Kim Peterson as a condition of the custody award. There were 
no findings made that the parties joint custodial arrangements were 
not working. (R. at 50-53). 
13. The Decree of Divorce was entered on June 1, 1988, also 
reflecting joint custody with Appellee being the primary custodial 
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parent, subject to Appellant's specified visitation rights. The 
Decree does not mention any requirements for Appellee to follow 
recommendations of the custody evaluator, Kim Peterson, as a 
condition for the award of custody. (R. at 55-57). 
14. Appellant petitioned the court for a modification of the 
Decree of Divorce on June 16, 1989. Appellant alleged that 
substantial changes in circumstances between the parties had 
arisen. These changes included the fact that Appellant had 
purchased a home, that Appellant had exercised his visitation with 
the minor children and that the visitation allowed to him had 
exceeded that awarded in the Divorce Decree, that Appellant had 
concerns about the children1s home environment, that Appellee had 
not followed through on custody evaluation recommendations and that 
there was concern over the health and education of the children. 
(R. at 59-63). 
15. Appellee denied the allegations set forth in Appellant's 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. (R. at 74). 
16. A second custody evaluation was performed, this time by 
Mr. Gary Taylor. Mr. Taylor found Appellee to be a good mother, 
found that the children love both parties and are bonded to both 
parents. (T. at 48-49, 60). 
17. A modification hearing was held on July 27, 1990. At the 
hearing, the following information was made available to the court: 
a. Prior to the parties filing for divorce, Appellee and 
Appellant had separated. Appellee established a residence with her 
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hearing. Appellee earned approximately $4.50 per hour in a part-
time job approximately eight to twelve hours per week. Appellee's 
former husband earns between $85,000 and $90,000 gross income per 
year before business expenses are deducted. (T. at 5, 65, 113) . 
g. Counsel for Appellee proffered information regarding 
his attorneyfs fees showing that $2,500.00 had been incurred. 
Counsel proffered that he charged $80.00 per hour and that the 
amount was reasonable in the community. Further, Counsel submitted 
billing statements showing what work had been expended on the case 
and what rate had been charged for that work. (Appellee's 
Exhibits, T. at 114-115). 
18. The trial court interviewed the children and found that 
both children desired to live in Scofield with their mother, and 
from these statements inferred that there was a stronger bonding 
with Appellee than with Appellant. (T. at 131) . 
19. The trial court also found that Appellee had been very 
free and generous in allowing additional visitation to the 
Appellant. (T. at 130). 
20. The trial court found that no material and substantial 
change of circumstances had occurred between the parties. Because 
there was no change of circumstances, the best interests of the 
children were not at issue before the court, although those 
interests were considered and discussed by the trial court. The 
court also awarded attorney's fees to Appellee in the amount of 
$2,500.00. 
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The question of when a custody award can be brought back 
before the court has been the focal point of a good deal of recent 
case law in the Utah appellate courts. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P. 2d 624, 626 
(Utah 1987), has stated that fl[a] central premise of our recent 
child custody cases is the view that stable custody arrangements 
are of critical importance to the child's proper development.11 
Among the concerns that the Court, and this court, have attempted 
to address is how to structure an avenue for considering the best 
interests of the minor children whose parents are seeking custody 
while, at the same time, protecting both the custodial parent from 
continuing litigation over custody and the children from "ping-
pong11 custody awards. Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah 1984). 
In Hogge, the Utah Supreme Court created a two-prong test 
requiring the party seeking modification of a custody award to 
first, establish that a change of circumstances had occurred which, 
then, would require a further consideration by the court of the 
child's best interests in a second prong. 
Even though the bifurcated proceedings set forth in Hogge 
remains the standard for custody modifications, recent decisions 
have refined the Hogge analysis. One of these recent decisions is 
Kramer. Supra. In Kramer, the Supreme Court held that the change 
of circumstances test applied only to the custodial parent, and not 
to the non-custodial parent. Id at 627. Therefore, in the event 
that the changes involved the non-custodial parent, the first prong 
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of Hogge could not be satisfied and there would be no finding of 
a change of circumstance. 
Justice Howefs concurring opinion in Kramer, however, 
questioned whether this was the proper focus in all custody 
modification proceedings. Most particularly, Justice Howe wrote 
of his concern "where a divorce decree and custody of a child is 
obtained by default.11 Id. at 629. In those situations, "there is 
no determination made by the court as to which parent would be 
superior in raising the child." Id at 629. 
Appellant argues that this is the central issue to the case 
at bar. Because there was no trial, and no findings resulting from 
a custody contest, then the best interests of the parties minor 
children have not been heard, and must now be considered. 
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not 
focusing on the best interests of the child rather than whether a 
change of circumstances has occurred between the parties. 
Appellant cites Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P. 2d 156 (Utah App. 
1989) to support his claim that a lesser showing of changed 
circumstances is required in the instant case because the original 
custody award was stipulated between the parties. Maughn 
recognizes the concerns raised by Justice Howe in Kramer, and has 
established a fact-oriented continuum for trial courts to consider 
in custody modification cases. With the Hogge and Kramer 
modification requirements being at one end of the spectrum, Maughn 
lies at the other end. 
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Mauqhn!s basic premise is that in order for the best interests 
of a child to be adequately considered, the trial court should 
examine all of the pertinent factors to make an appropriate custody 
award. This, of course, occurs when the trial court has had an 
opportunity to hear the evidence presented at trial. When this 
happens, a custody modification must pass the initial Hogge 
threshold of changed circumstances before the best interests of the 
child are to be considered further. If all of the pertinent 
factors have not been examined by the trial court, and the "custody 
award is premised on a . . . default decree", then Mauqhn requires 
a less rigid application of the changed circumstance test and 
allows a "greater range of evidence" to be considered in a custody 
modification proceeding. Id at 160. 
While the case at bar was a stipulated divorce, this fact 
alone is not determinative. The Mauqhn court stated that "on a 
petition for custody modification, trial courts should carefully 
scrutinize the facts behind the original award of custody." Id. 
at 160. This is certainly appropriate in the current case, and by 
scrutinizing the facts behind the original award of custody it is 
easy to see that a higher showing of change of circumstances should 
have been observed. Based on the facts presented there was no 
change of circumstances between the parties requiring a 
modification of child custody. 
Though the initial custody determination was stipulated 
between the parties, this was not the type of "default divorce" 
that Mauqhn was created to address, or that Justice Howe addressed 
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in Kramer, From the beginning, custody was at issue between the 
Appellant and the Appellee. In the divorce Complaint, Appellant 
sought joint custody of the minor children, while Appellee, in her 
Answer, sought sole custody. (R. at 2-5, 6-7). Further, Appellant 
sought for temporary custody through a contested Order to Show 
Cause proceedings which was denied, temporary custody being awarded 
to Appellee. (R. at 21, 30-31). Many of the issues argued in the 
Order to Show Cause proceeding were issues Appellant was concerned 
about at the time of the divorce when he stipulated to joint 
custody after fourteen months of contesting custody. Appellant, 
however, was then able to place those issues aside and agree to 
leave his children in an environment which he was claiming then to 
be harmful, and apparently is claiming to be harmful in his 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. 
Appellant should also be precluded from modifying the divorce 
decree based on the following facts. Pursuing his custody claim, 
Appellant individually sought out, pursuant to Court Order and a 
Stipulation with Appellee, hired and paid for an evaluator to 
perform a child custody evaluation. (R. 21, 30-31). This custody 
evaluation recommended that joint legal custody be awarded and that 
Appellee become the primary custodial parent. (T. at 38, 102-
103). After approximately fourteen months of contesting custody, 
after having the issue of temporary custody determined in favor of 
Appellee, after considering the recommendations of his own 
evaluator, after discussing the matter with his counsel, and after 
having entered a stipulation at a Pre Trial Settlement Conference 
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in which Appellant appeared but Appellee did not (R. at 44A, 55-
58), Appellant agreed to withdraw his custody claim and willingly 
agreed to settle for the custodial arrangement that is currently 
in effect between the parties. Further, even though Appellant now 
says that he did not approve of Appellee!s then-current living 
conditions, housekeeping or hygiene, he nevertheless agreed to the 
custodial arrangement. 
This is not the type of custody resolution that Maughn 
envisioned, or that Justice Howe articulated in Kramer, where one 
party, at a low time in their life, without the appropriate 
resources, or will, to fight, gives in to the custody claim of the 
other parent. Id. at 629. This is not a case in which a man and 
a woman resolve all of the issues between them and enter a default 
or stipulated divorce ending their marriage in the shortest time 
possible. Appellant had an opportunity to contest custody, he did 
so, and in so doing had the advice of two professionals hired by 
him to assist him in his case, his attorney and a custody 
evaluator. Only after he realized that he could not win custody 
of the children, he stipulated to joint legal custody. The only 
difference between this stipulated custody arrangement and one that 
is contested before the court was the actual hearing of the 
evidence by the court itself. The parties certainly knew the facts 
that would be relevant to a determination of custody, and most 
particularly, Appellant and his counsel knew that custody would 
probably not be awarded to him, either solely or as the primary 
custodial parent. Indeed, Appellant stipulated to the current 
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custodial arrangement, always thinking that he might bring the 
matter before the court once again. (T. at 34). 
Appellant should not now be able to try and derive some 
benefit from ceasing to seek custody because the facts presented 
at the time, and custody evaluation performed at the time, was not 
in his favor, and it appeared that he would lose his sought after 
custody award, and then be allowed to turn around and plan for 
another court battle in the future hoping to get a better result 
from a custody evaluator, and a different result from the court. 
This is exactly the type of harassment that the Hogge court 
considered when it set forth the bifurcated proceedings in order 
to "protect the custodial parent from harassment by repeated 
litigation11. Hogge at 53-54. Appellant planned all along to bring 
this matter back to court and should not now benefit to the 
detriment of Appellee, and to the disruption of the custodial 
arrangement his children have enjoyed, and counted on, for the last 
four years. 
From the facts of the case at bar, there appears to be no 
reason to believe that after hearing the evidence, including the 
custody evaluation, that the trial court would have awarded 
something more beneficial to Appellant that the current custody 
arrangement. Appellee believes that the case at bar is more 
closely aligned with Kramer and a more rigid application of the 
Hogge test was appropriate, and, therefore, a finding of changed 
circumstances of the primary custodial parent was required, which 
change of circumstances must "have some material relationship to 
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and substantial effect on parenting ability or the functioning of 
the presently existing custodial relationship. In the absence of 
an indication that the change has or will have such effect, the 
materiality requirement is not met.11 Becker v. Becker, 694 P. 2d 
608, 610 (Utah 1984). 
It is clear that there has been no detrimental change of 
circumstances effecting the parenting ability or the function of 
the currently existing custodial relationship with respect to 
Appellee, the primary custodial parent. What changes have occurred 
have been positive ones. Her yard now has grass, it is fenced and 
the diesel equipment has been removed from the area where the 
children play. These reasons were a primary reason for Appellant 
bringing the modification action. (T. at 36) . These issues are 
now resolved, were resolved prior to the modification hearing, and 
there is no further need, and was no further need, to consider the 
matter. The trial court's ruling was absolutely appropriate with 
respect to the facts presented in the modification hearing. 
II. THERE IS NO CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE CHANGES THAT 
HAVE OCCURRED ARE WITHIN REASONABLE CONTEMPLATION OF THE PARTIES 
AT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL DECREE. 
A second reason why this Court should uphold the trial court's 
finding that no substantial change of circumstances occurred in the 
case at bar was articulated by this Court in Fullmer v. Fullmer, 
761 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah App. 1988). In Fullmer, the parents 
stipulated that the mother should be awarded custody of their minor 
child. At the time of the divorce, the mother was working part-
time, and the father's girlfriend was pregnant with his child, 
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After the divorce became final, the custodial mother attempted to 
move to New York but, due to the father's modification petition and 
attendant restraining order, was unable to move. Having quit her 
job in preparation for the move to New York, the mother ultimately 
had to obtain full-time employment. The minor child was placed in 
day care. The father had remarried, his new wife did not work. 
The trial court found that there was a change in circumstances as 
the mother was now working full-time, the father had remarried and 
the minor child could be in the father's home with a step-mother 
who did not work. This Court found that the trial court abused its 
discretion in finding a change of custody. This Court found that 
the facts heard at the time of the modification hearing were facts 
that were "within the reasonable contemplation of the [father] at 
the time he stipulated to the custody arrangement and thus not 
legally cognizable.ff Id. at 947. This Court found that it was 
reasonably contemplated that the mother would have to find work, 
that day care would be needed for the minor child and that his 
girlfriend would become his wife. "Given [the father's] awareness 
of the circumstances at the time he voluntarily entered into the 
stipulation which awarded [the mother] custody, we find his 
petition to modify custody the very type of litigation and 
harassment from which our supreme court has attempted to protect 
custodial parents. Id. at 947-948. 
The case at bar is similar to Fullmer in many respects. It 
was reasonably conceivable that Appellant would move out of his 
apartment, perhaps into a home, that the children would begin 
- 16 -
school, that there would be days in the mountains that school 
busses would not be able to make their appointed rounds and that 
there would be opportunities available to the children in Salt Lake 
that were not available in rural Utah. These issues must have been 
considered by Appellant when he stipulated to allow Appellee to be 
the primary custodial parent. The trial court found that "where 
parties agree to something . . . the Court is caught in an 
inescapable corner to correct what parties do. . . Appellate Courts 
in this State look very dimly upon the Trial Court altering or 
amending something that's been fashioned by parties. So, the 
significance of a stipulated divorce is that you enter an 
agreement, and that ties the hands of the Court.11 (T. at 128-
129). The Fullmer Court found that a stipulation was a factor not 
to overlook when reasonably contemplated facts are raised in a 
subsequent modification proceeding. Fullmer at 947. 
Finally, it is apparent that Appellant's Petition for 
Modification of Decree of Divorce is based on basically the same 
facts that existed at the time he agreed to enter into the 
stipulated custody award. The primary focus seems to be on the 
environment in which his children are being raised. If this was 
of such concern to him at the time of the divorce, it should have 
prompted him to move into a home during the fourteen months that 
custody was at issue, or at least after the evaluator made his 
recommendations. It could easily be assumed that, once Appellant 
decided to contest custody, that he would move into different 
living arrangements in order to change his living circumstances, 
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a factor that Appellant believes was a basis for the initial 
recommendation by the evaluator. 
The facts and changes relied upon by Appellant in seeking a 
change in custody were either known to him at the time of the 
divorce and overlooked when he entered into the stipulation, or 
were reasonably contemplated between the parties and are of no 
consequence. 
III. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILDREN WERE TAKEN INTO 
CONSIDERATION BY THE TRIAL COURT BELOW. 
Appellee contends that Appellant has not overcome the initial 
threshold of Hogge, showing there has been a detrimental change of 
circumstances of the custodial parent. But, if this Court 
determines that Appellant has overcome this threshold, Appellee 
then argues that the court below considered the best interests of 
the minor children at the time of its ruling. (T. at 129). 
This court has held that there are many factors that a trial 
court should consider when determining best interests of minor 
children in custody matters. Here, the trial court examined the 
issue of bonding, finding that while the children were bonded to 
both parents, they were more bonded to the Appellee (T. at 131); 
examined familial love, and found that the children loved both 
parents; and examined parenting skills, finding that both parents 
seemed to be good parents. Further, the court inquired into, and 
determined the children's preferences finding that their preference 
was to remain with Appellee (T. at 131). In addition, the court 
found that other factors such as schooling (T. at 132) and the fact 
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that Appellee had been very generous with visitation (T. at 130) 
were factors to consider. 
It is also important to note that in considering the best 
interests of the children, even in light of Maughn, the continuing 
stability that the children have come to rely upon in the current 
custodial arrangement is to be carefully weighed. It is clear that 
this is not a situation where the court has continued a "lesser of 
two evils" choice, and it is also clear that the children appear 
not to have suffered from being in Appellee's care from long prior 
to the divorce until now. 
The Supreme Court, in Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 604 (Utah 
1989) , has recognized the Maughn holding but has, itself, held that 
"if an existing custody arrangement is not inimical to the child, 
the continuity and stability of the arrangement are factors to be 
weighed in determining a child's best interests." Further, the 
Court has stated that "[c]ustody placements, once made, should be 
as stable as possible unless the factual basis for them has 
completely changed." Becker v. Becker, 694 P. 2d 608, 610 (Utah 
1984) . 
In this matter, the factual basis for the custody placement 
has not changed in the last four years. Appellee still lives in 
the same place she did at the time of the divorce, she still lives 
with the same man, she still has the same habits and she is 
considered a good parent with whom the children are bonded. 
Further, Appellee believes that there is an interest in furthering 
the continuing custody arrangement if the children are not 
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suffering under its parameters. Appellee, therefore, believes that 
there is no need for custody to be changed and further believes 
that the lower court decision was appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
IV. THE JOINT CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS 
OF NO SIGNIFICANCE IN DETERMINING WHETHER A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
HAS OCCURRED. 
Appellant argues that because the parties enjoyed joint legal 
custody, there should be a lesser requirement in order to re-open 
the custody award. In Moody v. Moody, 715 P. 2d 507 (Utah 1985) the 
Utah Supreme Court heard a case in which the parties had been 
awarded joint custody at the time of the divorce, the award was 
pursuant to stipulation. Subsequently, the noncustodial father 
sought sole custody of the minor children, the custodial mother 
countered with her own petition alleging that the joint custodial 
arrangement was not working. The trial court specifically found 
that "communications between the parties are difficult and strained 
and that difficulty in communication has caused problems for the 
children, . . . and that [e]ach of the parties realized that the 
joint custody established in the Decree was not working." Id. at 
508. The Supreme Court found that "both parties ultimately agreed 
with the essential fact that the joint custody award was not 
functioning."Id. at 509. 
The case at bar is distinguishable from Moody. There were no 
allegations between the parties that the joint custodial 
arrangement is not working. Though Appellant alleged and prayed 
for sole custody, there is no allegations set forth in his Petition 
- 20 -
to Modify Decree of Divorce that state, or imply, that the 
arrangement is not a working arrangement. Instead, Appellant seeks 
a change in custody based on his improved living conditions, the 
fact that he believed Appellee had done nothing to improve her own 
or the children's environment, the fact that the children spent 
more visitation time with him than allowed by decree and that there 
were more educational and social opportunities for the children in 
town rather than in the country. (R. at 59-63). 
In the case at bar, the trial court did not find that the 
joint custody arrangement was not working. In fact, there was no 
real evidence placed before it showing that there needed to be a 
change in joint custody though the custody evaluator felt a change 
in the residence of the children was appropriate. The trial court 
specifically stated that Appellee had been "free and easy and 
liberal" regarding visitation and that "she's sensitive to the fact 
that [the children] need their father" (T. at 130) . Further, the 
trial court found that, rather than controversy and strife over 
visitation, or problems with child rearing issues, "the only 
significant barrier [Appellant has] in this case is the mileage and 
the weather conditions." (T. at 130). It is interesting to note 
that there is no information before the court that indicates the 
Appellant would be as free and easy and liberal regarding 
visitation if custody were changed. In fact, from the facts before 
it, it is easy to see the trial court coming to the conclusion that 
based on mileage, conceivable weather problems and the obvious 
problems with Appellee's living conditions, that Appellant might 
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seek to restrict visitation, which would be a detriment to the 
minor children, based on the opportunities to be with both parents 
that they have come to rely on in the past four years. 
This is not a matter that falls within the parameters set 
forth in Moody. Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion states that 
,f[a] joint custody order is premised on the parents1 ability to 
work out the details of custody between themselves. If the parents 
are unable to make this cooperative arrangement work, that alone 
shows a change of circumstances warranting a reexamination of the 
original order.ff Id. at 510. The modification action in the case 
at bar does not reflect that the "details of custody11 have been 
unworkable, and, therefore, falls outside the dicta set forth by 
Justice Zimmerman. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE 
APPELLEE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE PRESENTED. 
The most recent appellate case regarding the issue of 
attorney's fees in divorce cases is Munns v. Munns, 790 P. 2d 116 
(Utah App. 1990). In Munns, this court established a two-part test 
requiring the party seeking attorney's fees to "show evidence (1) 
establishing the financial need of the requesting party, and (2) 
demonstrating the reasonableness of the amount of the award." Id 
at 122. 
This case, like Munns, presents a party who does not have an 
extensive work history, nor was that party employed to any extent 
at the time the court heard the matter, and, therefore, had a need 
for assistance regarding attorney's fee payments. Appellee 
testified that, at the time of the lower court hearing, she earned 
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$4.50 per hour at a part-time job (T.- at 64-65, 97), had just begun 
work and had not yet even received a paycheck (T. at 97) . She also 
indicated that her work was seasonal and would not continue into 
the winter. (T. at 65) . Further, she testified that she had 
incurred attorneyfs fees and had contributed approximately $550.00 
to $600.00 toward the modification evaluation (T. at 81) . Finally, 
her then-counsel proffered that he was paid at a set rate which was 
reasonable for both Salt Lake County and southern Utah, and, in 
support for Appellee's request for attorney's fees, counsel 
presented an Exhibit showing his billings and the basis for the 
billings (T. at 114, 115). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that in this type of case, 
"awards of attorney's fees must be supported by evidence which 
shows that the requested award is reasonable. Relevant factors of 
reasonableness include 'the necessity of the number of hours 
dedicated, [which was shown by Counsel's Exhibit], the 
reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of 
the case and the result accomplished, [again, shown by the 
Exhibit], and the rates commonly charged for [this type of action] 
in the community' [proffered by Counsel, T. at 114-115)]. Also, 
the party requesting the award must show financial need [which was 
shown by the fact that Appellee had little income, historically or 
currently, to litigate this matter].ff Beals v. Bealsy 682 P. 2d 
862, 864 (Utah 1984) . 
Further, in Maughn, a case cited by Appellant in his brief, 
this Court upheld an award of attorney's fees where counsel had 
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proffered the number of hours spent on the case and his hourly r^te 
for those -.ours. The Maughn appellant, as does this Appellant, 
stated ~o m " there was an abuse of cue trial cool~'s J i so: o a \:,r. 
"because it overlooked the standard set forth in Taliey v. Taliey, 
739 P.2d 33 (Utah App. 1987). 
The Maughn Court, at 162, found that "[i]t is clear from the 
record that fees were incurred and [the custodial mother] was in 
financial need." The Court found persuasive that pleadings had to 
be prepared, that pre-trial hearings were held, and that discovery 
was needed, all of which were reflected in the court's file. The 
Court found that "[t]he trial court had sufficient information to 
assess the necessity of the hours." Id. at 162. This Court 
deferred "to the trial court's assessment of the reasonableness of 
the fee and the financial need of the parties, [and found] no abuse 
of discretion." Id. at 162. 
Appellee has clearly established her need for financial 
assistance and has shown the reasonableness of the amount awarded. 
Further, the trial court sits in a unique position to review the 
file, to determine the reasonableness of the work done on behalf 
of a party seeking fees, has the ability to assess the abilities 
of the parties to pay fees, and, in accordance with Maughn has the 
mandate to award fees. 
The Munns tests have been met and the award of fees and costs 
by the trial court should be upheld. 
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In addition, pursuant to Rule 34, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellee requests this court to award costs and expenses 
incurred by responding to Appellant's appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The appropriate decision has been reached by the court below. 
The appropriate tests were utilized by the court, and that all 
relevant factors were considered and that the lower court decision 
should be upheld. The custodial arrangement of the parties should 
not be changed and the trial court's award of attorney's fees and 
costs should be upheld. Further, costs on appeal are requested in 
Appellee's behalf. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *5 day of April, 1990. 
David S. Dillon 
Attorney for Appellee 
Audrey Crouse 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of 
July, 1990, at 10:00 o'clock a.m., this cause came on 
for custody hearing before the HONORABLE KENNETH 
RIGTRUP, District Court, without a jury in the Salt 
Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
KATHLEEN MC CONKIE 
Attorney at Law 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER 
Attorney at Law 
CAT by: CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR 
1 gross-monthly income? 
2 A. Gross, about 2,000. 
3 Q. Isn't it true that you have been 
4 married? Have you been married, Mr. Crouse? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And with whom were you married? 
7 A. Audrey Crouse. 
8 Q. What is the date of your marriage? 
9 A. 12-6 of '83. 
10 Q. And are you divorced? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And when were you divorced? 
13 A. Some time in June, I believe, the 6th of 
14 '86. 
15 Q. Do you have children? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. What are the names of your children? 
18 A. -- Ray Crouse, age six; and Brandon 
19 Douglas, soon to be five. 
20 1 Q. Mr. Crouse, do you have family that live 
21 within the vicinity of this jurisdiction? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. And tell me who they are? 
24 A. I have my mother, who resides in 
25 Tooele. My brother and sister both reside in Tooele. 
5 D. CROUSE WIT PET D 
1 who brought this action before this Court? 
2 A. Yes, it is. 
3 Q. Could you tell the Court why you felt it 
4 was necessary to --
5 A. I feel like --
6 THE COURT: You have got to let her 
7 complete her question. 
8 MS. MC CONKIE: Could you tell the Court 
9 why you felt it was necessary to modify the custody 
10 and visitation arrangement? 
11 A. I f eel tha€7 the 1 iving cond itions that/. 
12 Audrey arid her husband live in are inadequate to "raiser 
13 I children. They live in a metal warehouse that has J'-
14 I been divided in two, :and>has—- you know, a sink and a 
15 bathroom and some bedrooms. I feel the compound that^ 
16 surrounds Tthe .entire"structure; is full of heavy; 
17 I "equipment.^ "It' is Itull of diesel tanks. It is full of, 
18 1 — it is; at grease^pit.^ He works out of the back end -
19 I of ;fltT ~;He~owns V cl^sTruction business. 
20I In the beginning, they had a diesel pump 
21 out in front of the house, and I was able to pressure, 
22 to some degree, the -- Audrey and her ex-husband, or 
23 whatever he is, to remove it. It wasn't even locked. 
24 And I was just afraid that the young kids could maybe 
25 I get into the diesel. It since, has been removed. 
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these changes have been made? 
A. Th~e re^TF<T15¥¥n™*a^TlEen~c¥ c o n s t r u c t e d : i n i 
t h e ^ f r o n t of h i s p l a c e _ t h a t r e s e m b l e s more lof a dog,. 
run , but i t ' s b a s i c a r e a , ~ f o o t a g e s : I t i s about e i g h t 
f e e t - - t e n f e e t wide byA i o , . 3 0 f e e t long".,1 
Q. Mr. C r o u s e , when was t h a t f e n c e e r e c t e d . 
do you know? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Oh, I would say less than a year. 
Was it" afT¥r^y^ouTbeVarTXhIsTil[vysuTt? " J 
Y e s . ; 
To your knowledge, have there been any 
other changes made? 
A, Not to my knowledge, no. 
Q. Has t h ^ r ^ b e e i T r g r a s s p l a n t e d ? ^ / 
A. I don't see evidence of it; but thatVs 
not to say that they didn't.throw out4some .seed J 
Q. To your knowledge, do you know if 
there's been an outsTde'^'acce¥FTto'^E^eT^s"talFiI, 
bedrooms^ 
A . 
Q . 
No, iraoTnotj^b eneve * t h e re^is/ 
I'm going to show you some pictures, 
which I think you have already viewed. 
A. Yes. I took these pictures. 
Q. Could you tell me when you took those 
pictures, please? 
22 D. CROUSE WIT PET D 
1 full-day basis, five days a week? 
2 A. Correct. 
3 Q. I believe you testified that your 
4 divorce occurred in June of '86 -- June of '88? 
5 A, Yes, it would be. 
6 Q. I am just trying to clear that up. Do 
7 you recall where Audrey lived prior to the time that 
8 the divorce decree was entered in June of f88? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Is it rthe same dwelling in ScofieXdTthat 
11 we : a'r e talk ing abou t? r 
12 A. Yes./ 
13 Q. Do you recall when she moved there? 
14 A. She left there the day I returned from 
15 Denver, Colorado. I arrived on a Friday, that 
16 Saturday morning her ex-husband, at that point in the 
17 game, and her and the -- well, she left Tosha and 
18 Brandon with me, and the two boys and her and this guy 
19 moved up there. 
20 Q. And would that have been in the Spring 
21 of f88, sometime? 
22 A. That would have been exactly March 21st. 
23 Q. Of? 
24 A. '87. 
2 5 Q. '8 7? 
27 CROUSE WIT PET X 
A. Yes. I t took us 14 months to get 
divorced before the actual action was f ina l ized . 
Q . 'Sor^f rdifi'^ March 'of*-1 87 r^through 'the 
present ,^as J a r^as ypu^know, sjy^g^cpntinued j:o l ive ^ 
in the,same building in Scofield? " 
A. Correct . 
Q. Do you know whether or not there are 
other children of Brandon's age and Tosha's age nearby 
in Scofield for the kids to play with? 
A. They have both told me that they have a 
couple of friends, Tosha. And Brandon, he really 
never did give me an actual name of somebody who plays 
with him. He was telling me that he played with his 
brothers. So, I'm not aware of any children other 
than those. 
Q. And to your knowledge, would those be 
the three brothers that are also still residing in 
that same building? 
A. Right. 
Q. Now, you've indicated that you were 
concerned about Tosha's education because at school 
she spent a half a day in the library before she was 
returned home on the bus, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Isn"1 "tTffa t *" t h e s a me \ t h i hg you i n t e rid.
 L t o 
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Q. So, without offending anyone, and I hope 
you understand it wouldn't be -- excuse me. Let me 
rephrase that. You would believe that children should 
have some type of Christian and ethical, moral type of 
teaching, whether you go to church or not? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Do you know whether they receive that 
when they are residing with Audrey? 
A. She"has told me.,that she goes to V 
church. But, as far as what they get out of that and 
how far it goes, no,~*I "am* noF aware of it. 
Q. If I suggested to you, or rather if I 
informed you, that there were two recommendations in 
this prior report that Mr. Peasley discussed with you, 
and you've hit on those. One was the removal of the 
diesel pump? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the other was fencing the yard. 
You've been familiar with those two recommendations? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you understand that there were more 
recommendations than that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has there been grass planted, now, in 
this place? 
30 CROUSE WIT PET X 
A. The last time I was there, I seen no 
evidence of what we call "grass," that you plant. 
Crab grass, or maybe alfalfa grass. 
Q. Let me present you with what has been 
marked as Exhibit A to your Affidavit originally filed 
in this matter. 
A. Okay. 
Q. And ask you if you can identify that 
picture? 
A. Yes, that's the front of their building. 
Q. Does it appear there is some grass 
planted? I 
A. There's some green vegetation there, $ 
yes. 
Q. That picture doesn't show the fence, is 
that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
That's correct• 
But, it is up now? 
Right. 
And the diesel pump has been removed? 
Yes. 
MR. WINCHESTER: I have no further 
questions at this time. 
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MS. MC CONKIE: One quick question for 
31 CROUSE WIT PET X 
1 characterize your living arrangements as being better, 
2 worse? 
3 A. Structurally, we've improved. It is a 
4 much larger accommodation, and it is mine. 
5 MS. MC CONKIE: Thank you. 
6 No further questions. 
7 RECROSS--EX-ftMTNftTIt>N 
8 BY MR. WINCHESTER: 
9 Q. Mr. Crouse, on testimony just now, you 
10 referred to having previously fought for custody of 
11 these children. 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. At that time Mr. Peasley was your 
14 attorney, was he not? 
15 A. Correct. 
16 Q. And a custody evaluation was performed? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And after the custody evaluation was 
19 performed, you had an opportunity to discuss the 
20 results and the recommendations of that evaluation. 
21 And after Audrey had lived in Scofield for a good year 
22 and a half, you still stipulated that these children 
23 could be staying with her as the primary custodian? 
24 A. It was based on the attorney that I had 
25 hired at that time. 
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Q. 
A. 
Hef in fact --
He told me that Mr. Peterson -- do you 
want me to tell you what he said to me? 
Q . Go ahead. 
A. He told me that he took the easy way 
out. He took my money and favored the woman. 
Q. But, you still agreed, based on whatever 
the evaluation said, that Mr. Peasley told you that 
joint custody be granted Audrey — 
A. On his recommendation to take it now, 
and then come back later. You got to settle now, and 
then go back into the court. 
Q. And there was no fences there back in 
those days? 
A. No. 
Q. 
A. 
There was no grass? 
No. 
Q. The diesel pump was in the yard? 
A. No, I think -- I'm not sure, exactly. 
It might have been removed during this transition 
time. I know that he removed that diesel pump, or at 
least put a lock on it, I will say that. 
Q. But, some of those safety concerns were 
present then? 
A. Still, yes. 
34 D. CROUSE WIT PET RX 
Q. Why? 
A. Because I wanted them to be in a safe 
environment. I don't want to have to be informed one 
evening that something has happened. 
Q. And because of those changes not being 
made, wasn't it your testimony -- did you not testify 
just earlier that that was one of the reasons, because 
the changes had not been made, that you decided to 
bring this action? 
A. Correct. 
MR. WINCHESTER: No further questions, 
Judge. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MS. MC CONKIE: I would like to call 
Dr. Gary Taylor, please, to the stand. 
GARY-TAYLOR, called as a 
witness on behalf of the Petitioner, after having been 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
D TRECT- -EX-AMINATION 
BY MS. MC CONKIE: 
Q. Thank you for coming, Dr. Taylor. Would 
you please state your full name for the record? 
A. Gary Marvin Taylor. 
Q. And where do you reside, Dr. Taylor? 
A. In Salt Lake City. 
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A. They have various tracks that you can go 
into in social work, and mine was Clinical and 
Administration. 
Q. 
include? 
When you say "Clinical," what does that 
A. I did a Family Therapy Track, and 
individual counseling, group therapy as well as 
marriage and family. 
Q. Dr. Taylor, what are your 
responsibilities at Primary Children's Hospital? 
A. As the Director of Medical Social Work 
and Psychology, I have a staff of 14 MSW's, one Ph.D. 
Psychologist. There are various students that we 
train there, also. 
Q. So, you also have in your capacity --
professionally, you also teach? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you teach other individuals, or in 
the capacity, give them some sort of experience in the 
area of social work? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
Would that include counseling? 
Yes, very much so. 
And therapy? 
Yes. 
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very good about calling and setting that up, 
Q. And when you arrived in Scofield, can 
you describe for the Court your impressions of the 
physical facility? 
A. It was a very smelly place, I thought 
it was a warehouse, or a construction site would be a 
good description. It Iwa~sT me t al ;~ja "1 ot^o f ^Pgj^yi 
large, and lots of machinery around it** You cross the 
railroad tracks, and then turn immediately into the 
driveway. And the front was fenced. It was covered 
with snow, so I don't know whether there was grass 
there or not. 
Q. You say the fence was going -- was there 
fencing around the entire property? 
A. No. It is hard to describe. You drive 
in the driveway, and the fence lines the driveway, and 
then it also goes out along the side of the highway 
that you come into town on. It's (Indicating) --
Q. What was your impression of the home 
when you got into the home, the physical facility 
inside? Would you describe the outside? What was it 
like on the inside of the home? 
A. windows "wTfe ^ covered ^iTE^^squenfe. It 
had been stapled up. The furnitureTwas-tatfered^and?1 
torn. The carpeting was dirty. Not just a little 
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1 way the children acted with Mr. Crouse? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Could you tell the Court your opinion on 
4 their interaction with both parents, such as, for an 
5 example: Are they bonded to both parents? This type 
6 of thing? 
7 A. I would say that they are bonded to both 
8 parents. 
9 Q. In terms of bonding, is that a concern, 
10 or an issue, when you do a child custody evaluation? 
11 A. Very much so, yes. 
12 1 Q. And would it be your testimony that you 
13 would try and pick up on whether they bond with one 
14 person or another? 
15 A, Yes. 
16 Q. And, also, Dr. Taylor, you provided for 
17 the Court a custody evaluation where you discussed 
18 your interviews with Mr. Crouse and Mrs. Crouse and 
19 your feelings about the children. You discussed 
20 background and discipline and description of the 
21 physical facility, all of those things. Do you have 
22 an opinion — and I believe you've already expressed 
23 an opinion, excuse me, in the evaluation -- as to 
24 where the children would -- what would be in the best 
25 interests of the children in terms of their custody 
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1 and visitation arrangement? 
2 A. Yes, I do. May I say something before 
3 that? 
4 1 Q. Please. Yes, preface it with what you 
5 would 1 ike? 
6 A, The children^ of the parents, 
7 and it is real obvious that Audrey is a
 vgppd^^pyybHBr to 
8 the children, and Doua isr too. 
9 My concern then, changed from not 
10 whether Audrey's a good parent or Doug's a good 
11 parent, as to what the children -- what can benefit 
12 the children the most. And I was concerned about 
13 Brandon's speech impediment. I was concerned about --
14 at the time, I thought, well, if there is some danger 
15 towards Tosha, as far as others, a possible sex abuse, 
16 or just being at home -- or not at home, but being at 
17 school all that time, not having anything to do except 
18 be with the librarian -- I know that Doug would be 
19 very likely to give the children the kind of medical 
20 attention that they need. Aside -- these are things 
21 aside from the housing. The housing, in a way, is a 
22 shell. Doug's house is definitely better. It is more 
23 -- it is newer. It's cleaner. It is certainly well 
24 taken care of. And he's very concerned about taking 
25 care of the children and providing for them the best 
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them, directly, "Who do you want to live with?" 
Brandon and Tosha were both already emotionally too 
vulnerable to do that, to put them on that -- in that 
k ind of a spot. 
Audrey told me that Brandon told her 
that he wanted to stay with his mother. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Doug told me that the children wanted to 
stay with him. So, obviously, it is a judgment call. 
Both parents are good parents to these kids, and so 
therefore, it -- I changed from what the child's 
preference was to what would be best for him or her. 
Q. You didn't directly ask the children? 
A. Right. 
Q. And I take it there was nothing in what 
you observed that gave you some great clue one way or 
the other as to what they preferred? 
A. They are about the same in both houses. 
Although, Brandon's a little more free, if you will, 
to show off and drive around, do his thing. He plays 
a little bit more. 
THE COURT: Where? 
THE WITNESS: At the Scofield house. 
MR. WINCHESTER: I take it that that's 
the incident that you referred to, motorized Jeep, or 
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something like that? 
A* Yes, they are wild, 
Q. You've discussed here today the benefit 
of keeping these two children with the other three, 
and the fact that there are some distinctions there 
and so forth, and I won't go into that anymore. Did 
the children seem happy and well-adjusted in Scofield? 
A. Yes. Other than Tosha still does her 
thing of being very clingy, behind the person. She 
doesn't leave the parents' side. She's very --
Q. She reacts the same way in Doug's house 
in Magna? 
A. She's a little more away from Doug. She 
didn't cling to him as much. 
MR. WINCHESTER: Thank you. 
MS. MC CONKIE: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
May this witness be excused? 
MR. WINCHESTER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may be excused. Thank 
you 
MS. MC CONKIE: We have no other 
witnesses. Your Honor. 
MR. WINCHESTER: Your Honor, if the 
Court would allow, I'd like to call Audrey Crouse 
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1 entered between you and Doug Crouse, did you also 
2 reside with Doug Trease in Scofield? 
3 A. Yes, I have. 
4 Q, Was Mr. Crouse correct when he said you 
5 moved there on or about March, something, of 1987? 
6 A. Yes, he was. 
7 Q. Are you able to provide daily care for 
8 these two children? 
9 A. Daily care as of being home with them, 
10 or --
11 Q. Yes. 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Do you work outside the home? 
14 A. I have a part-time job inside the home, 
15 helping Doug to his bookwork. 
16 Q. All right. Have you ever worked during 
17 the course of your previous marriage to Doug Trease or 
18 your marriage to Doug Crouse? 
19 1 A. When I was married to Doug Trease, I did 
20 have a job, when we was living in Arizona, as a 
21 nurse's aide in a rest home. And when I was with --
22 when we had split up, I had had a job as a clerk or a 
23 cashier/register person, or whatever, at a store. 
24 When I was with Doug Crouse, I have not had a job. 
25 Q. So, since your marriage to Doug Crouse, 
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you have stayed home with the children? 
A. Yes• 
Q. Those would include both Brandon and 
Tosha and your children from your prior marriage to 
Mr. Trease? 
A. Yes, they were. 
Q. Do you intend to go back to work outside 
the home at any time in the near future? 
A. I am doing a part-time job as of last 
week, working at a store two to three days a week. 
Q. Where is that store located? 
A. In Scofield. 
Q. And how many minutes is that from the 
house? 
A. Probably three. If you walked, it would 
be three minutes. 
week? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
How many hours per shift do you work? 
Probably four. 
So, four hours, two or three times a 
Yes. 
Q. Do you intend to continue that job? 
A. Probably not when winter gets here. 
They just needed somebody for the summer. 
Q. Who watches the children while you are 
65 A. CRODSE WIT RPT D 
working those shifts? 
A* I haven't had Tosha and Brandon. And 
the neighbor that also works at the store, she watches 
my baby. And then when she gets to work, I take her 
baby. 
Q. What about the other two, Brock and 
Scott? 
A. They help her with my little boy, or 
they are out playing with their friends. 
Q. Are the kids generally dirty when Mr. 
Crouse comes to pick them up? 
A. I think he's wrong there, because 
they've always had a bath. I put them in the bathtub 
before he gets there. And my little girl's hair is 
constantly done. There was one occasion where he 
didn't come at the right time, and we was sitting 
outside, and they did tend to get a little dirty 
playing in the dirt. 
Q. Describe the exterior of this building 
that you live in? 
A. The outside of it? 
Q. Yes. 
A. It's got large equipment. It didn't 
have a fence when we went to court the first time. It 
does have a fence now. It is not a permanent fence 
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1 because we are looking for -- we have a bid on a 
2 permanent fence coming in. We -- the gas pumps are 
3 removed. It does have grass. The whole yard is not 
4 I in grass. There is a place for a swing set, and there 
5 is a sandbox now there. There is a swing set. They 
6 have a jungle gym/dome thing that they play on. But, 
7 there is grass, and we are in the process right now of 
8 putting in a cement -- putting in a new sidewalk and a 
9 driveway, and there will be cement on the outside. 
10 Q. Do the children ever play outside of the 
11 fenced area? 
12 A. Not -- very seldom. They will get out 
13 once in a great while. Since the fence has been put 
14 up, they very seldom get outside of the fence unless 
15 we go to the neighbors to play. 
16 Q. So, I assume that the jungle gym and all 
17 that is enclosed by the fence? 
18 A. Yes, it is. 
19 Q. Does your home smell of diesel fuel? 
20 A. I don't think it does. 
21 Q. All right. Describe the inside of your 
22 home for me? 
23 A. The inside of our home is -- we got two 
24 bedrooms downstairs. There's a bathroom. There is a 
25 kitchen, a dining room and a living room. And if you 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
It is drafty? 
No, it is not. 
There is also some testimony, I think 
from -- I can't remember whether it was from 
Mr. Taylor or from Mr. Crouse -- that there was 
Visquene on the windows? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me finish my questions, if you will, 
even though they are long, and that is the way lawyers 
talk, and it is bad. 
There was some testimony this morning 
about some Visquene on the windows in the winter. 
A. Yes, there was. 
Q. Does that help at all? 
A. I couldn't really tell you if it helps 
or not, but I really never used Visquene on the 
windows. We done it that year. 
Q. So, have you done it since then? 
A. It hasn't been another winter yet, so --
Q. Excuse me. Okay. When was the grass 
planted outside? 
A. I started doing a little piece of grass 
that was in the picture that you had. I had done that 
when I had first moved up there. I had took out, and 
I had dug and dug, and resoiled it, and whatever. I 
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1 had threw grass out. It had taken a couple of months 
2 where the grass would start coming up, because our 
3 soil up there is bad. 
4 Q. Do you recall when the diesel pump was 
5 removed from being near the swing set? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. When was that? 
8 A. It was done -- probably, it was done 
9 last summer. 
10 Q. Summer of f 89? 
11 A. Summer of '89. 
12 Q. It was done, probably, in March of last 
13 summer. 
14 Q. When was the temporary fence put up? 
15 A. It was put up, probably -- I think it 
16 was up right before Thanksgiving. 
17 Q. Of last year? 
18 A. Yes. Or, I guess -- I don't know. We 
19 couldn't have dug it then. So, it had to be up before 
20 that, because it was cold. 
21 Q. Now, both Mr. Taylor and Mr. Crouse have 
22 referred to the fact that the building is close to a 
23 major highway, that the swing set is close to a major 
24 highway, that the now-fenced area is close to a major 
25 highway. The picture would so indicate. What kind of 
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1 touched. And then in the meantime, they made Scott go 
2 to a mental health -- it is called Four Corners Mental 
3 Health Institution in Price. And they had had a talk 
4 with him, and they come back and says, "No, he has 
5 never touched her." So, my guess is that they got 
6 nowhere. 
7 Q# Now, you have incurred some attorney's 
8 fees to my firm in this matter, have you not, as 
9 regards to the modification? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And have you also paid approximately 550 
12 to $600 to Mr. Taylor for your share of the 
13 evaluation? 
14 A* Yes, we have. 
15 MR. WINCHESTER: Thank you. 
16 I have no further questions at this 
17 time. 
18 THE COURT: You may cross. 
1 9 CfrOS-S^gXAMItsfATTON 
20 BY MS. MC CONKIE: 
21 Q. Isn't it true that you've been married 
22 twice? 
23 A. Yes, I have. 
24 Q. Your first marriage, you testified, was 
25 I to a person that you are living with now? 
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1 Q. So, other --
2 A, I told him that there's no sense in 
3 bringing her back before we know exactly what -- if 
4 they are going on strike, or not, because it might --
5 if they say that they are going on strike, then they 
6 wouldn't be going on strike on the 10:00 o'clock 
7 news. So, I just told him: "You can go ahead and 
8 keep them until we figure out and find out if there is 
9 a teachers1 strike or not." Because, I do believe 
10 that he needs to spend time with his children. 
11 Q. As a whole, for the whole school year of 
12 '89, 1990, approximately, how many days did she miss? 
13 A. She probably missed seven days. 
14 Q. Do you, in fact, have some monthly 
15 income, personal from your work at the store, now? 
16 A. I haven't got a check from them because, 
17 like I said, I just started working last week. 
18 Q. How much per hour do they pay you, do 
19 you know? 
20 A. $4.50 an hour. 
21 Q. Do you love your children? 
22 A. Yes, I love my children. 
23 Q. All five of them? 
24 A. All five of them. 
25 Q. Do you desire custody to remain as it 
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1 stand. 
2 D-OUtSI/ftS--R;~ CROPSE, recalled 
3 as a witness on behalf of the Defendant, after having 
4 been previously duly sworn, testified as follows: 
5 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. WINCHESTER: 
7 Q. Mr. Crouse, during our lunch break, I 
8 had the opportunity to review both of the 
9 child-custody evaluations that were performed in this 
10 case, one by Mr. Peterson and now one by Mr. Taylor. 
11 I want to run down a quick list of questions with 
12 you. During your marriage to Audrey, would you call 
13 her a good housekeeper or a bad housekeeper? 
14 A. A bad housekeeper. 
15 Q. Did you have problems or concerns with 
16 her personal hygiene during your marriage? 
17 A. Yes, I did. 
18 Q. And I assume that meant that in your 
19 opinion she didn't have good hygiene? 
20 A. We discussed on numerous occasions about 
21 the way she kept the home and herself. 
22 Q. Did Audrey spend time with the kids 
23 during your marriage? Did she spend a lot of time 
24 with them, or any time with them? 
25 A. Yes, she spent time with them. 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Did she yell at the children? 
Continually. 
Did she work or stay at home? 
Pardon? 
Did she work or stay at home? 
She wouldn't work. 
Q. All right. After the separation and 
prior to the time the divorce was final, you 
previously testified that she lived in Scofield? 
A. Yes. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
house? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
evaluation? 
A. 
Q. 
You knew that? 
Yes. 
The yard was not fenced at that time? 
It was not. 
And there was no grass? 
No, there was not. 
And the gas pump was too close to the 
Right. 
You knew all those things? 
I voiced them concerns, yes. 
Did you pay for the Kim Peterson 
Yes, did I. 
Did Audrey contribute to that at all? 
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A. No, not at all. 
Q. Now, finally, Mr. Taylor referred this 
morning to some stuttering problems that Brandon has, 
and told us today that he had made some 
recommendations to you. Did you follow up on those? 
A. I — prior to talking to Mr. Taylor, the 
preschool that he attended, I secured a doctor's name, 
of who I had -- would have him tested by. But, it was 
upon Gary's and the woman that I talked to that --
once I introduced him into therapy, it is something 
that I have to continue. I could not, incidentally, 
ten days a month, send him to therapy, and then send 
him up there. It was something that I'd have to start 
and continue on. So, up until then, I have not 
referred him to it, to therapy. 
Q. If you are awarded the permanent -- not 
-- the sole --
A. The residual --
Q. During the school year, would you in 
fact see that that was done? 
A. Yes, I would. 
MR. WINCHESTER: Thank you. 
No further questions. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MS. MC CONKIE: Just a quick. 
103 D. CROUSE WIT D 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
was during 1989? 
THE WITNESS: Gross income was probably 
somewhere between 85 and 90,000. 
THE COURT: How much? 
THE WITNESS: 85 and 90,000. 
THE COURT: By gross, that's before you 
take your business expenses off? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you prepare your own tax 
return? 
THE WITNESS: No, I have an accountant. 
THE COURT: Do you remember what the net 
income from business was on your Schedule C? 
THE WITNESS: It was probably zero, or 
minus, because of depreciation and all. 
THE COURT; Do you remember what the 
annual depreciation figure was? 
THE WITNESS: I don't have any idea. I 
don't get involved very much in that, either. 
THE COURT: Anything more? 
MR. WINCHESTER: No, Your Honor. Thank 
you 
THE COURT: You may step down, 
MR. WINCHESTER: We rest. 
THE COURT: Rebuttal? 
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MR. WINCHESTER: Oh, excuse me. 
MS. MC CONKIE: Are you going to do 
clos ing? 
MR. WINCHESTER: One additional thing 
before I said we rest, if I may with Counsel's 
permiss ion? 
MS. MC CONKIE: I am sorry. I won't 
give you permission. 
MR. WINCHESTER: I would like to proffer 
regarding my attorney's fees, Your Honor. I had 
previously provided Counsel with monthly statements 
that have dealt with the attorney's fees applicable 
solely to this petition to modify. They begin in July 
15 of 1989. Apparently, no work was performed in 
August. There was one for September and October, 
November. Nothing in September. I have broken down, 
roughly, some figures, and they are just 
approximations. 
Totality of the fees at $80 an hour, 
which is a reasonable amount in the community, here in 
Salt Lake, as well as in Southern Utah, including 
today's work, which I've estimated at six hours, would 
be $1,700, give or take. 
My travel costs, which may be excess in 
-- certainly could have been avoided had Mrs. Crouse 
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chosen to retain local counsel, are about $600, and 
that's for three trips to Salt Lake and back. And the 
only cost that Defendant has incurred would be her one 
half of the child custody evaluation for $580. And I 
assume that the Plaintiff's was very close, if not 
exactly the same. Total about $2,500. 
And I might also add that on one of my 
statements, I had given my client a $320 adjustment. 
That is the time that we came up for pretrial 
conferences. We met in your chambers for quite 
awhile. The reason that I did that, the only way I 
could get back to Cedar City was to fly to Las Vegas 
and back to Cedar. There is some excess hours in 
there that we took back out of the $2,500 total 
approximation. I have given these to your clerk, and 
asked that they be marked as Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 2. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MS. MC CONKIE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Number 2 is received. 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 Admitted.) 
MR. WINCHESTER: Thank you. Now, I 
rest. 
THE COURT: Do you have any penetrating 
questions you want to ask of Mr. Winchester? 
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1 report that pertains to Mr* Crouse, and dwells less on 
2 that aspect of it with Mrs. Crouse. The Court has no 
3 I evidence of what the apartment was or why the fact 
4 that you are now a fee owner is anymore desirable than 
5 where you lived before; though, it might be inferred 
6 that there might be a more stable situation with 
7 I homeowner ship. I don't know that we have any 
8 particular studies that suggest one way or the other, 
9 that somehow homeowners develop better citizens than 
10 J renters or those sorts of thing. 
11 J The' situation^aS^hewsa¥e7"Ipretty^much, 
12 J with Mrs*. Crouse." She lived at Scofield at the time 
13 you stipulated to the divorce. And other than you 
14 buying a new home, the Court really sees no remarkable 
5 changes. Changes, if any, are the fence, I suppose, 
16 a n (Lj^ little plot of grjtss jand^a Jew. minor changes; 
17 I though, the Court really ^ doesnlt perceive those to be 
18 I veryVsIgiTifTcanit? 
19 The second thing that the Court has to 
20 consider -- and I don't understand Counsel's comment 
21 exactly, I guess -- that there is no law. I think 
22 there is abundant law, Mr. Winchester, that where 
23 parties agree to something, that the Court is caught 
24 in an inescapable corner to correct what parties do. 
25 I So, if you think that you can enter a bargain, and 
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1 then escape from it lightly, Appellate Courts in this 
2 State look very dimly upon the Trial Court altering or 
3 amending something that's been fashioned by parties. 
4 So, the significance of a stipulated divorce is that 
5 you enter an agreement, and that ties the hands of the 
6 Cour t. 
7 I think given the material and 
8 substantial change of circumstance problem and the 
9 fact that you entered a stipulated divorce, that 
10 requires the Court to conclude that your petition is 
11 without merit and should be dismissed. And it 
12 shouldn't be dismissed without any examination at all 
13 of the issue of the best interests of the children; 
14 but, let me comment on that just briefly. 
15 The Court observes a number of things: 
16 First, with my interview with Tosha and Brandon, I, 
17 like Dr. Taylor -- he sort of acknowledges that maybe 
18 in some cases, he asks the kid. It is not my function 
19 to put kids on the spot to make choices. That's my 
20 function, and I take that responsibility, to decide 
21 who they ought to live with. And the Court is not 
22 infallible. It does that right in some cases, 
23 perhaps, and wrong in some cases. But, I, at least, 
24 canvass the issue broadly enough with the kids that if 
25 they feel strongly about it, they will volunteer, 
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1 because I ask open-ended questions at the end, "Is 
2 there anything you would change? Is there anything 
3 that you would like the Court to do?" And if they 
4 have strong feelings, they will volunteer. 
5 The Court observed right off that Tosha 
6 clung to her mother, and didn't want to let her mother 
7 go. She was quiet. And when I got Connie to retrieve 
8 the Twinkie, that helped a little bit, and she started 
9 talking a little bit more freely. But, she was still 
10 shy. Brandon was a little more talkative, but he's a 
11 shy child, as well. We can't blame that on to 
12 Mrs. Crouse, because your own perception is that 
13 you've had the children as much as she had. So, 
14 you've had an opportunity to be as much of an 
15 influence in the children's life as their mother. 
16 ThaT'lT a str ik Fng T:hing Jto *the-J2our t,i 
18 
-* ~„ S. .^.-'Su? «&£»«& A*««v. 
17 that Mrs. Crouse is so free and jeasy^aiid
 s^JbjM^al f ^ and ^ 
she's sensitive to the fact that they< needftheir p* 
19 father; and, been very generous in that situation:? 
20 And it is, unfortunately, more often the case in 
21 contested matters that the custodial parent is 
22 crowding and making barriers. And the only 
23 significant barrier you have had in this case is the 
24 mileage and the weather conditions. But, she has 
25 I afforded very, very liberal opportunity to give you 
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access to the children. 
In my interview, I asked about the 
relationship with you, with Mrs. Crouse, with Doug 
Trease; and, the kids expressed love and liking and 
expressed a bonding as to all three parents. And they 
express it rather evenly. They don't single out one 
parent as being better in their eyes than the other 
parent. But, I did ask them in a specific way where 
they would like to live, Scofield or Salt Lake City, 
and they both want to live in Scofield. The Court 
would infer from that that perhaps they have some 
stronger bonding with their mother. 
The bargain that you struck, initially, 
in stipulating to the divorce, was grounded upon an 
evaluation of Kim Peterson, and Kim Peterson observed 
that you both had good qualities and were good 
parents. And I assume one of the significant factors 
he considered, in coming down in favor of Mrs. Crouse, 
was that he perceived, at least at that point, that 
there was stronger bonding with the mother, that she 
was the primary caretaker and so forth. 
You've got kids that are still at a 
tender age. You've got one that stutters — has 
solved some significant problems. You have no 
evidence that Salt Lake City's schools are superior to 
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1 Carbon County schools. I have no evidence that there 
2 are no speech therapists in Carbon County* I suspect, 
3 if you communicate with Mrs. Crouse in an effective 
4 way, there can be some treatment afforded in Salt 
5 Lake, if there's none available in Price, to be 
6 coordinated with the time they are there, to see a 
7 speech pathologist. And there are those up at the 
8 University, if there aren't others in the community, 
9 that can help assist in that program. Where you've 
10 had the children most of the summer, the Court is 
11 hard-pressed to understand why you have to have a 
12 final resolution of the issues to prevent you at least 
13 from going and consulting on that problem and getting 
14 with some program to take care of speech limitations. 
15 That's an awfully significant thing to a young child 
16 in terms of self-esteem and things that kids go 
17 through in terms of development. And in the old days 
18 -- I've got a wife that's blind in one eye, and she 
19 has ill feelings towards her parents. But, when we 
20 were poor, kids grew up with crooked teeth and things 
21 that we correct nowadays. And we make big, big 
22 sacrifices as parents to correct and do for our 
23 children. 
24 So, I'd suggest that even though your 
25 petition is denied, you are still -- you still have a 
132 DECISION 
